基于奖惩机制的网络货运平台监管策略演化博弈分析
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华东交通大学交通运输工程学院

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国家自然科学基金(72061013);江西省科协课题(产业数字化赋能江西传统产业转型发展的对策建议,2021年)


Evolutionary Game Analysis of Regulating Strategy Based on Reward and Punishment Mechanisms
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    摘要:

    近年来,网络货运平台的迅速发展给货运市场带来了极大地便利,同时也给政府监管部门带来了监管难题。本文基于演化博弈理论,引入奖励和惩罚机制,构建了网络货运平台与政府监管部门间的演化博弈模型,并对其均衡点的稳定性进行了分析。理论研究与仿真结果表明:①在静态惩罚下,无论是静态还是动态的奖励机制,系统均不存在均衡稳定点;②在静态奖励动态惩罚和动态奖惩机制下,两者均趋于一个稳定的均衡点,且在动态奖惩机制下效果更好;③网络货运平台的运营行为受到政府奖惩政策的影响,且惩罚机制的约束性作用更为显著。

    Abstract:

    The rapid development of the online freight platform in recent years has brought great convenience to the freight market, meanwhile some regulatory problems occurred to the governments. Based on evolutionary game theory, with the introduction of reward and punishment mechanisms, an evolutionary game model between online freight platforms and government regulators is constructed in this paper, and the stability of their equilibrium points is analyzed. The results show that: (i) under static punishment, there is no equilibrium stability point in the system, no matter whether the reward mechanism is static or dynamic; (ii) under the static reward dynamic punishment and dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, both sides tend to a stable equilibrium point, and the effect is better under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism; (iii) the online freight platforms" behavior is affected by the government"s reward and punishment mechanism, and the binding effect of the punishment mechanism is more significant.

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历史
  • 收稿日期:2022-04-04
  • 最后修改日期:2022-06-06
  • 录用日期:2022-06-07
  • 在线发布日期: 2023-06-21
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