基层员工建言行为的演化博弈分析
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华东交通大学

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F279.23

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Suggestion Behavior of Grassroots Employees
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    摘要:

    员工建言行为处于促进企业发展的重要地位,管理者调动其下属员工的建言积极性,促进企业与员工深度交流是未来管理发展的必然趋势。在企业内部信息不完全流通假设前提下,针对基层员工不愿意建言的问题,文章引入蛙鸣博弈的基本思想,剖析基层员工单方建言决策的动态过程,以期为企业促进建言的制度设计提供实践指导。研究发现:不同初始条件下员工演化稳定策略存在差异,演化稳定策略点的位置受多重因素的共同作用,企业可作为的空间较大。

    Abstract:

    Employees'' behavior is an important part of promoting the development of enterprises. Managers mobilize the enthusiasm of their employees to promote the deep communication between enterprises and employees is an inevitable trend of future management development. Under the premise that the internal information of the enterprise is not completely distributed, the article introduces the basic idea of the frog-sounding game, and analyzes the dynamic process of the unilateral decision-making of the grass-roots employees, in order to provide practical guidance for the system design of the company''s promotion. The study finds that the employee evolutionary stability strategy is different under different initial conditions, and the location of the evolutionary stability strategy point is affected by multiple factors, and the enterprise can take a lot of space.

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历史
  • 收稿日期:2019-11-20
  • 最后修改日期:2019-11-20
  • 录用日期:2020-05-20
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