Evolutionary Game Analysis of Regulating Strategy Based on Reward and Punishment Mechanisms
DOI:
CSTR:
Author:
Affiliation:

Clc Number:

Fund Project:

  • Article
  • |
  • Figures
  • |
  • Metrics
  • |
  • Reference
  • |
  • Related
  • |
  • Cited by
  • |
  • Materials
  • |
  • Comments
    Abstract:

    The rapid development of the online freight platform in recent years has brought great convenience to the freight market, meanwhile some regulatory problems occurred to the governments. Based on evolutionary game theory, with the introduction of reward and punishment mechanisms, an evolutionary game model between online freight platforms and government regulators is constructed in this paper, and the stability of their equilibrium points is analyzed. The results show that: (i) under static punishment, there is no equilibrium stability point in the system, no matter whether the reward mechanism is static or dynamic; (ii) under the static reward dynamic punishment and dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, both sides tend to a stable equilibrium point, and the effect is better under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism; (iii) the online freight platforms" behavior is affected by the government"s reward and punishment mechanism, and the binding effect of the punishment mechanism is more significant.

    Reference
    Related
    Cited by
Get Citation
Share
Article Metrics
  • Abstract:
  • PDF:
  • HTML:
  • Cited by:
History
  • Received:April 04,2022
  • Revised:June 06,2022
  • Adopted:June 07,2022
  • Online: June 21,2023
  • Published:
Article QR Code