Evolutionary Game Analysis of Regulating Strategy Based on Reward and Punishment Mechanisms
CSTR:
Author:
Affiliation:

Clc Number:

Fund Project:

  • Article
  • |
  • Figures
  • |
  • Metrics
  • |
  • Reference
  • |
  • Related
  • |
  • Cited by
  • |
  • Materials
  • |
  • Comments
    Abstract:

    Based on evolutionary game theory, with the introduction of reward and punishment mechanisms, an evolutionary game model between online freight platforms and government regulators is constructed, and the stability of their equilibrium points is analyzed. The results show that under static punishment, there is no equilibrium stability point in the system, no matter whether the reward mechanism is static or dynamic; under the static reward dynamic punishment and dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, both sides tend to reach a stable equilibrium point, and the effect is better under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism; the online freight platforms' behavior is affected by the government′s reward and punishment mechanism, and the binding effect of the punishment mechanism is more significant.

    Reference
    Related
    Cited by
Get Citation

甘卫华,刘郑,刘亚楠,李春芝.基于奖惩机制的网络货运平台监管策略演化博弈分析[J].华东交通大学学报英文版,2023,40(1):34-43.
Gan Weihua, Liu Zheng, Liu Yanan, Li Chunzhi. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Regulating Strategy Based on Reward and Punishment Mechanisms[J]. JOURNAL OF EAST CHINA JIAOTONG UNIVERSTTY,2023,40(1):34-43

Copy
Share
Article Metrics
  • Abstract:
  • PDF:
  • HTML:
  • Cited by:
History
  • Received:
  • Revised:
  • Adopted:
  • Online: February 23,2023
  • Published:
Article QR Code