【Objective】To compare and analyze the resilience of route networks in terminal areas of different airports within an airport cluster. 【Method】This study uses the Guangzhou terminal area and the Zhuhai approach terminal area as examples, applying complex network methods to construct route network models for each. The network topology is analyzed in detail using indicators such as node degree, degree distribution, betweenness centrality, clustering coefficient, network diameter, and average path length. Based on this analysis, node importance is identified using degree centrality, betweenness centrality, and the KBKNR algorithm. Additionally, scenarios of random attacks and deliberate destruction are designed, and network efficiency and connectivity are used as metrics to evaluate the resilience of the route networks.【Results】The experimental results show that under random attacks, the Zhuhai Terminal Approach Air Route Network demonstrates greater resilience compared to the Guangzhou Terminal Air Route Network. Conversely, under intentional attacks, the Guangzhou Terminal Air Route Network exhibits stronger resilience. Moreover, degree centrality attacks are more likely to cause network collapse compared to betweenness centrality attacks, indicating that nodes with high degree centrality should be prioritized for protection as critical nodes.【Conclusion】This study can help identify critical waypoints or air routes and implement corresponding protection measures, thereby improving the operational efficiency of flights in terminal areas.