In the critical period of epidemic prevention when a few infection cases occurred or the epidemics spread slightly in the city, public transit system offers the basic guarantee for urban trips. To ensure public transit operation performance and service quality during the critical period of epidemic prevention, the paper studies the dynamic game relationship between public transport supply and passenger demand from the perspective of service supply and demand matching. Aiming at the conflict states composed by the six strategies of the public transit provider and user in the critical period of epidemic prevention, a conflict graph model was constructed with the consideration of the balance and dynamic game between public transit providers and users. With sequence diagram, the relative preference of the decision-makers was ranked to the feasible states. For different types of conflict stabilities, the steady states were analyzed of the public transit provider and user. Case analysis was conducted on public transit of Suzhou to collect the preference of transit provider and user to different strategies via questionnaire. It is found that Nash steady state of public transit supply and demand is identified when the provider cuts transit shifts by 50% and stops transit service in isolation area, while the user stops unnecessary transit trips. The research provides scientific insights on public transit strategy in the critical period of epidemic prevention, conciliating the conflicts between transit supply and demand under special events for new balance.